The Default Premium and Corporate Bond Experience I. Introduction
The emergence of organized markets for low-rated corporate (or junk) bonds has provided financial researchers with an opportunity t o address a fundamental question: a r e holders of default-prone debt compensated (actuarially) for t h e risk of default? Past research on this market has focused on t h e default experience of corporate debt. A quite different a r e a of research involves modeling t h e spreads between t h e returns of bonds of different credit quality. Few (if any) research e f f o r t s have combined these approaches by using past default experience t o explain differential r a t e s of return on low-. rated bonds.
In this study we develop a risk-neutral model of t h e expected probability of default for low-grade bonds as a function of t h e additional required r a t e of return on these instruments over default-free bonds. Within this framework, securities a r e priced as functions of t h e first moment of t h e return distribution. The techniques a r e used t o express this pricing relationship in terms of the yields t o maturity of risky bonds as well as their holding period returns. W e then compare t h e default r a t e s implied in corporate bond yields t o a series based on recent corporate bond default experience. We also discuss why implied default r a t e s cannot be obtained from measured holding period returns. Finally, attention is paid t o macroeconomic indicators of expected default rates.
In an early paper on t h e subject of default risk premia, Fisher (1959) suggested that t h e risk premium required on a corporate bond (holding maturity constant) depends on t h e likelihood t h a t t h e issuing firm will default (defined here as a failure t o pay any coupon or principal payments when due) and on t h e "marketability u of t h e bond. In addition, modern approaches acknowledge t h e influence on required returns t h a t result from call provisions, t h e t a x effect for deep discount bonds (due t o t h e different tax treatment of o r d~n a r y Income vs. capital gains), and sinking fund payments (which reduce t h e average maturlty of a firm's debt). Isolating t h e influence of default likelihood on interest-rate differentials involves controlling for these other effects.
As Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984) pointed out, studies t h a t attempt t o explain corporate bond prices c a n b e identified 3s being either "macro N in nature, in t h a t relative bond prices a r e modeled as being "functions of t h e supply and demand of various assets, and/or t h e position of t h e economy in t h e business cycle," o r as being "microw in t h a t relative prices a r e modeled .as a function of firm specific characteristics. The approach taken in this paper i s macro; t h a t is, t h a t aggregate returns on a sample of bonds a r e used t o infer average default probabilities for t h e population of bonds with similar characteristics.
In order to test hypotheses concerning t h e models derived in this paper, w e assume t h a t bond market participants a r e in complete agreement as to t h e probability of default f o r a particular issue. W e further assume t h a t all bonds a r e perceived, and therefore priced, as having t h e same likelihood of default as others in t h e same rating category. Ideally, t h e assigned rating gives, in a single measure, t h e rating agency's estimate of t h e issue's probability of default.
Studies t h a t have attempted to measure t h e importance of rating changes on bond price movements tend to differ in their conclusions. Hettenhouse and Satoris (1976) as well as Weinstein (1977) conclude t h a t market participants incorporate new information before a rerating. On t h e other hand, Eder~ngton, Yawitz, and Roberts (1984) Section I1 contains a discussion of t h e construction of t h e default r a t e series used in this paper. In section 111 w e present a model of t h e pricing ofdefault-prone bonds in terms of their required y~e l d s t o maturity and compare derived implied default r a t e s with actual default experience. Section IV repeats this exercise for holding period returns and discusses t h e complications of using holding period returns. Section V investigates t h e relationship between changes in expected corporate default r a t e s and certain macroeconomic measures. In section VI w e present a summary of t h e paper and some closing remarks.
Measuring Corporate Defaults
Economists have tracked t h e performance of corporate debt beginning with a study by W.B. Hickman (1958). His and almost every subsequent study defines t h e r a t e of default as t h e value of issues defaulting during t h e period examined divided by t h e value of bonds outstanding during some part of t h e --p e r~o d (usually t h e beginning). Altman and Nammacher (1985) (A&N hereafter) argue that, since almost all defaults over t h e last few years have occurred in t h e low-rated sector, t h e appropriate measure of the corporate default r a t e includes only t h e value of low-rated bonds in the denominator.
In A&N, and in this study, only publicly held, straight (non-convertible) corporate debt with a speculative (or no) rating is included in t h e denominator. Convertible bond defaults were included in t h e numerator for our measurements, however, because of t h e likelihood t h a t market participants do not differentiate between losses in this sector and t h e straight bond sector. In t h e six-year period from t h e beginning of 1980 through 1985, a total of $3.586 billion of corporate debt defaulted, roughly $1.021 billion of which consisted of convertible issues. Eliminating these defaults would substantially reduce our measured default rates. The actual default r a t e series presented below i s therefore biased upwards. A complication arises in t h e construction of a measure of t h e default r a t e for bonds of a given rating: by t h e time an issue defaults, i t has usually descended in rating until it has reached t h e rating D (for Default). We, therefore, limit our analysis t o t h e performance of all low-rated corporate debt. W e note that t h e constructed series a r e based on the assumption that defaults result in a total loss t o bondholders. In fact, AhN find t h a t defaulting bonds continue to t r a d e at 41 percent of par within one month following t h e default. Therefore, t h e actual ttloss rate t1 i s somewhat lower than our default r a t e estimates.
Default R a t e s and Yields t o Maturity
Our theoretical model is based on t h e pioneering work of Bierman and Hass (1975) , with subsequent extensions by Yawitz (1977) . The proposed model is in t h e same spirit as t h a t used by Yawitz, Maloney,and Ederington (1983) to model yield spreads in the municipal bond market on the basis of differing default probabilities and tax effects. 1
Most asset-pricing models are based upon the first and second moments of the return distribution. With risk-neutral preferences, on the other hand, agents consider only the first moments of the distributions of return: the security's expected return completely determines its market price. This framework facilitates the construction of -a certainty-equivalence pricing relationship.
Assume that a promised coupon (or principal) payment will be rendered at the end of a given period with a perceived probability P. A payment prot mised t periods from now i s expected to be received with probability P . A default occurs (and applies only to payment streams for which there havebeen no previous defaults) with probability (1-PI. In the event of a default, a fraction of the promised coupon and principal payments is received, denoted here by p.
I f capital markets are frictionless, and information is costless, arbitrage will force the market price of a certainty-equivalent (default-risk-adjusted) payment stream, discounted at the riskless rate of interest to be equal to a risky stream, discounted at the appropriate risky rate of interest. Algebraically:
where i is the riskless rate of interest, r is the risky rate of interest, C is the promised risky coupon rate, and N is t h e number of years to maturity.
Using a geometric sum formula to express (1) without summations, we have:
The yields to maturity, i and r, a r e for bonds t h a t a r e identical in all respects except for t h e likelihood of default. Further simplifications of t h e above expression a r e possible, if one approximates t h e finite-maturity coupon bond with a perpetuity, and if one assumes t h a t default results in a total loss t o debt holders. 2
A more general specification of equation (I) would involve time-subscripts for t h e variable P, so that payment r a t e s would be allowed t o vary over calendar time (hence t h e term structure). The product of t h e PIS from t
t h e initial d a t e t o t h e relevant payment d a t e s would replace P in t h e first term in t h e numerators of t h e left hand side of (1). The product of t h e P's from t h e initial d a t e t o t h e d a t e preceeding t h e payment d a t e would be multi-
plied by 1 minus t h e expected payment r a t e in t h e relevant period for t h e second term. Of course, t h e r e is no way to identify t h e values of t h e separate expected probabilities of payments. In addition, a closed-form solution like t h a t of equation (2) could not be found. The use of a single, constant measure of P c a n be interpreted as an "average" likelihood of payment, sum- longer than 10 years in maturity.) In addition, we were able t o obtain t h e weighted coupon r a t e s and weighted maturity d a t e for t h e sample at e a c hpoint in time. Defaulting bonds a r e removed from t h e sample, as a r e issues t h a t are upgraded t o investment-grade status.
Complications arise in t h e analysis because of several uncontrolled factors. First, nearly all corporate bonds contain call provisions. In a sample of 702 currently outstanding, publicly held, low-rated (or nonrated) issues, all but 32 had call provisions, and 97 were being called as of January 1986. In practice, many (high-coupon) low-rated bonds t r a d e on a yield-to-call basis.
Of course, high-grade corporate bonds also carry call provisions. The f a c t t h a t t h e low-rated sample consists of high-coupon issues, increases t h e likelihood t h a t they would be called if interest r a t e s fall significantly (or if t h e f irmls financial condition warrants an up-grading). This and o t h e r factors imply t h a t t h e r e is no comparable high-grade index t h a t will exactly match each of t h e characteristics (apart from default risk) of t h e low-rated sample.
As a compromise, w e chose to use Salomon Brothers' New Medium Term Industrials index f o r Aaa rated bonds, found in their Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads. This series is based on estimates (by Salomon's Syndicate Department) of t h e required yields on issues coming t o market that a r e rated Aaa and will mature in 10 years. These estimates were made a t t h e beginning of month t + l and were aligned with the low-rated index observations that were taken on the last day of month t.
It has been observed that new issues a r e priced at yields slightly higher than t'seasoned" issues, due t o their relative lack of liquidity. The Aaa/AAA rated yields were chosen t o represent t h e default-risk-free r a t e s largely because of t h e lack of defaults by bonds originally issued with this rating in t h e past 15 years. Using t h e yields on long-term U.S. Treasury issues a s t h e default-free yield would complicate t h e analysis, because these securities lack-.
call provisions, and because their returns a r e subject t o different tax treatment. In addition, t h e sheer volume of transactions involving Treasury bonds introduces t h e possibility that yield differentials reflect a marketability factor.
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Finally, cross-sectional variations in t h e measured returns of a sample of representative bonds can be attributed t o firm-specific idiosyncrasies. It i s assumed t h a t t h e average measured returns will vary systematically a s t h e result of a factor t h a t is tied t o t h e default experience of corporate bonds.
The use of a weighted average of bond returns causes t h e influence of t h e idiosyncratic variations t o cancel one another. Hickman (1958, p.66 ) discusses t h e difficulties of using (weighted) average returns as measures of t h e return on a pooled investment portfolio. H e concludes t h a t under most conditions, A numeric solution program was employed t o solve (2) for t h e expected "payment rate", P, given supplied values for r, I, p, C, and N, at the end of each month t. This is a measure of t h e cross-sectional average of ~mplied expected payment rates, based on the yields of a cross-section of low-rated bonds. A problem emerges, however, because of t h e aggregation procedures used.
L e t us assume t h a t P i s an implicit function of r (with i, C, p, and N held fixed). Since (2) cannot b e solved explicitly f o r P, a computer simulation was employed to graph t h e implicit function with restrictions on t h e values of t h e other variables and a n assumption about t h e relationship between C and r. Figure 2 i s a graph of t h e simulation. Note that when t h e payment r a t e P i s ' equal t o 1, t h e risky r a t e takes on t h e supplied value of t h e riskless r a t e (10 percent here). The relationship between P and r is shown t o be convex in t h e relevant range. Jensenls inequality, therefore, suggests t h a t t h e cross-sectional average of P will b e g r e a t e r than, o r equal to, t h e measured payment rate.
This implies t h a t our estimate of (I-PI, t h e implied expected default rate, is biased downwards.
A plot of (I-PI, t h e expected default r a t e implied by our model of yield differentials, is presented in figure 3 along with a plot of t h e moving average default series. The f a c t t h a t t h e implied expected default r a t e series appears t o track, and even lead, ltactualll default r a t e s so well i s surprising, given that t h e implied r a t e represents an average of expected future default rates.
This behavior indicates a degree of myopia on t h e part of market participants. The spread between implied and actual (smoothed) default r a t e s is also surprisingly large and persistent over this period.
Acknowledging t h e statistical complications introduced by t h e construction of these variables, one may gain additional insight by using regression techniques. Cochrane-Orcutt adjusted regressions of (1-P) on constants and the "raw tt default r a t e series, ADR, a s well as the smoothed default r a t e series, SADR, a r e presented below in table 2. These regressions indicate that there is some connection between measured implied default rates (based on risk-neutral preferences) and the two actual default r a t e series. The adjusted R-squares of 10.2 percent and 11.1 percent, respectively, indicate t h e per-
centage variation in t h e implied default r a t e series t h a t is "explained" by t h e two measures of actual default rates. The large t-statistics for t h e constant terms cause us to reject the null hypothesis t h a t t h e market's (risk-neutral)
estimate of default r a t e s equals actual default r a t e experience. In fact,'.
evidence suggests t h a t market prices imply default r a t e s t h a t exceed actual
default rates by roughly 5 percentage points.
IV. Default Experience, Holding Period Yields, and Ex-post Performance
In this section, w e apply t h e default-risk-neutral framework t o t h e pricing of risky d e b t in terms of t h e expected holding period yields on default-prone and default-free bonds. A bond's holding period return embodies changes in t h e market price as well as coupon earnings (pro-rated for t h e holding period). Define Bt t o be t h e default-free bond's market price at t h e end of period t, and C t t o be t h e promised coupon payment earned in period t. Now let t h e holding period return for a default-risk-free bond be defined
by Ht, such that:
For the certain case in which m equals 1, E(ht) will equal h whereas in t h e t t '
case of certain default, E(h ) will equal (p-l), resulting in a loss to t h e t bondholder. In the absence of market imperfections, equilibrium in the riskneutral setting requires t h a t t h e expected net-of-default return on t h e default-prone and the default-free bond will be equal. Setting t h e right-hand side of ( 5 ) equal to Ht and using equation (4), we have:
Subtracting both sides of (6) from ht and rearranging, gives:
where (I-mt) is the period-specific expected default r a t e embodied in t h e holding period yields of t h e default-prone and default-free securities, given an assumed recovery rate, pO5 Note that (7) represents a risk-neutral, ex a n t e relationship between expected holding period returns and expected default rates.
A bond's realized holding period return, however, i s an e x post measure of performance. Conversely, measured yields-to-maturity a r e based on expected performance and embody e x a n t e expected default rates. Bond holding period returns may deviate from expected returns, limiting our ability to measure implied default r a t e s from t h e difference between holding period yields of risky and risk-f r e e bonds.
Consider a short-run increase in t h e expectation of corporate defaults.
Ceteris paribus, this would have the effect of reducing t h e prices of outstanding low-rated bonds, thereby reducing t h e measured holding period return h . IJnder most conditions, this would lower t h e "implied" default r a t e (1-mt). 6 t Indeed, below we show t h a t relatively short-run price movements (resulting from new default information) can cause t h e r~ght-hand side of (7) t o take on negative values, thereby violating t h e definition of a probability. Therefore, (7) cannot be used t o obtain implied default rates. What one obtains from applying this formula t o e x post returns is a differential "performance rate"
for low-rated bonds.
A. Holding Period Data.
A proxy for ht was constructed monthly by Blume and Keim (1984) 
based on t h e price movements and coupon payments of t h e bonds used in Salomon
Brother's Low-Rated (or High Yield) Bond Index (discussed above). The "merged1' series s t a r t s at t h e end of January 1980 and covers through June 1984. It has a mean of 1.14 percent (for a n equivalent annual average return of 14.57 percent) and a standard deviation of 4.09 percent.
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As a measure of t h e holding period returns on default-free bonds, Ht, w e used Salomon Brother's High Grade Index for t o t a l rate-of-return found in their Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads (up to December 1985) .
The index was formed by calculating t h e total returns of roughly 900 issues with weights based on issue size. The weights a r e revised monthly, and bond issues a r e included and deleted as ratings a r e updated. The average weighted maturity of t h e issues at t h e end of 1985 was 22.1 years. This series i s also used as a benchmark return in Blume and Keim (1984) .
In order to minimize extraneous influences on holding period yields, a holding period of one year was selected, in addition to the one-month holding period. The Blume-Keim series was converted t o an annual return series by accumulating monthly returns over t h e past year a t each month. That is, the measured annual holding period return at each d a t e is based on t h e returns to bond holders who sold a security purchased one year earlier (and collected coupon payments for t h e period). With these measures of return, (7) implies t h a t annual performance r a t e s a r e estimated.
In figure 4 , we present a plot of t h e performance r a t e implied by equation (7), obtained from annual holding period measures, along with t h e historic moving average default rate, SADRt. Confirming our intuition, negative performance rates exist when actual default experience is highest. The performance rate, (I-mt), reaches a minimum value of -0.1009 in November 1982, t h e month following t h e maximum value reached by the smoothed actual default r a t e series. It i s clear t h a t periods corresponding t o negative performance r a t e s a r e those in which one-year holders of low-rated bonds realized significant losses. In general, t h e performance r a t e series descends as actual default r a t e s rise, and vice-versa.
In table 2 , w e present t h e regressions of t h e measured performance rates (expressed in annual terms and based on one-and 12-month holding period yields) on t h e two actual default r a t e series. The low R-squares indicate t h a t relatively little of t h e variation in performance r a t e s is explained by actual default rates. The negative coefficients on actual default rates and t h e significant t-statistic on t h e smoothed default r a t e series supports t h e observa-tion of a negative correlation between actual default rates and t h e performance of low-rated bonds. The significant (and positive) t-statistics on t h e constant terms of t h e regressions, using a performance r a t e series formed from 12-month holding period yields suggest that, on average, holders of lowrated bonds realized significant holding period gains relative t o their highgrade counterparts.
V. Default Expectations and Macroeconomic Measures
In this section, an attempt is made t o allow for t h e influence of other macroeconomic variables, in addition t o actual corporate default rates, on implied default and performance rates. P a s t studies of differential quality spreads have used an assortment of macroeconomic indicators. J a f f e e (1975) examines factors t h a t influence t h e risk spread of corporate yields in a cyclical fashion. He finds t h a t t h e most significant variable in explaining t h e risk spread i s a measure constructed by Fair (19711, based on d a t a collected by t h e University of Michigan Survey Research Center, which acts as a proxy f o r consumer sentiment. This factor was also used by Cook and Hendershott (19781, in addition t o others, to explain t h e spread between high-grade corpor a t e and Treasury securities. Rather than t a k e this approach, implied default and performance r a t e s a r e tested for correlation with new default information and surprises in macroeconomic measures.
It i s well known t h a t in periods of (unanticipated) rising prices, firms with fixed nominal contractual obligations tend to benefit. Conversely, (unanticipated) reductions in prices may cause hardship to some firms. Since expect e d inflation will already b e incorporated into t h e contracts, it is t h e unan-ticipated part of inflation that will a f f e c t t h e probability of default. Therefore, a natural macroeconomic proxy is the deviation of t h e percentage change in t h e consumer price level from expectations. Other indicators of macroeconomic activity a r e the Board of Governors of t h e Federal Reserve's industrial production index and the Labor Department's unemployment r a t e estimate.
Two characteristics of our sample period tend t o limit t h e effectiveness of this exercise, however. The first is t h e relatively short sample period available to us. The size of t h e market for low-rated bonds approached significance only towards t h e end of t h e 1970s. The identification of long-run relationships is, thus, seriously hampered. Secondly, in the sample period of this study, t h e overall inflation r a t e was, on average, falling, a f t e r a long period of accelerating inflation. The e f f e c t s of this regime switch on t h e reported results is indeterminate, introducing t h e possibility t h a t t h e behavior of market participants over a longer period may well differ from t h e behavior exhibited here.
To test for a relationship between unanticipated inflation rates and our estimates of implied default and performance rates, w e constructed a n unanticipated inflation series by subtracting one-month-ahead forecasts of t h e percentage change in t h e CPI (obtained from Money Market Services) from actual monthly percentage changes. Similar series were constructed for measures of t h e unemployment r a t e and t h e percentage change in industrial production (a monthly proxy for GNP). O n e would expect that, if agents
incorporate new information about t h e economy (in addition t o firm-specific factors) into their expectations of default rates, these proxies will be related to changes in expected default rates.
For vat-ious sample periods, we regressed t h e first differences of implied default rates, obtained from differential yields t o maturity (I-P), on a constant, actual default rates (in levels a s well as first differences), unanticipated inflation, unanticipated industrial production, and unanticipated unemployment. The macroeconomic surprises were lagged one month, a s the tirning of the actual series normally lags the reported period by a few weeks. The results, found in table 3, indicate that of t h e t h r e e macroeconomic indicators, surprises in reported measures of industrial production have t h e highest correlation with implied expected default rates, although t h e level of actual default r a t e s contributes slightly more. When t h e first differences of actual default r a t e s a r e used, t h e surprise in inflation appears t o have t h e highest (negative) correlation with expected default rates. However, no variable enters significantly in either regression at t h e 95 percent confidence level.
The low adjusted R-squares also leads us t o conclude t h a t current macroeconomic surprises a r e poor indicators of expected default rates.
The same regressions, adjusted for serial correlation of t h e error terms, were run using t h e implied performance r a t e (based on one-month holding period yields, converted t o annual rates) in place of expected default rates. Also found in table 3, t h e s e results suggest that, though insignificant at t h e 95 percent confidence level, surprises in inflation a r e most closely related (positively) t o performance rates. It must be t h e case t h a t firm-specific factors dominate t h e formation of default expectations t o t h e point t h a t surprises in macroeconomic measures a r e poor predictors of overall quality spreads.
VI. Summary & Conclusions
This paper represents t h e first e f f o r t t o tie together the. differential returns required by holders of low-rated corporate bonds and t h e actual default experience of these issues. A model of the behavior of low-rated bond pricing was developed in a risk-neutral setting. W e applied t h e model t o the observed returns of a sample of bonds and compared the default rates implied in these returns to t h e default experience of low-rated debt. W e conclude that t h e default r a t e s implied in corporate bond returns exceed those experienced in recent years. In this sense, holders of well-diversified portfolios of low-rated corporate bonds a r e rewarded for bearing default risks. It was also shown that measured holding period returns cannot be used t o extract implied default rates.
Finally, w e examined t h e relationship between a s e t of macroeconomic variables and expected measures of default and performance rates. W e conclude that expected corporate default r a t e s a r e not related t o any of t h e macroeconomic variables at t h e 5 percent critical level, although expected default rates were most strongly related t o surprises in inflation measures and actual default rates. Surprises in output proxies appear t o have less of a relationship t o expected default rates.
Further study in this a r e a will require t h e accumulation of better (and more detailed) measures of corporate bond returns. The construction of a standardized d a t a base, modeled a f t e r t h e C e n t e r for Research on Security Prices (or CRISP) tapes, would most benefit f u t u r e endeavors in this field. In addition, a longer sample period would increase our understanding of both t h e pricing of default risk and t h e relationship between expected default r a t e s and macroeconomic activity.
Treasury bonds from AAA/Aaa rated corporates, may mostly reflect this tax differential.
5. As in footnote 2, the assumption that default results in a total loss to bondholders (that is, p=0) gives:
6. The partial derivative of (1-mt) with respect to ht is: 7. See Blume and Keim (1984) for a description of this series. 
